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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper addresses the differences in corporate governance regarding generations of Austrian 
and German family businesses. Generations differ from each other significantly with respect to the 
percentage of non-family executives in management boards. The existence of a supervisory board 
differs between founder and subsequent generations, but it turns out that with transfer of owner-
ship to subsequent generations, there is no noticeable trend concerning the percentage of non-
family members in supervisory boards. Thus, this study demonstrates the importance of a compre-
hensive and profound analysis of generation-specific characteristics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
amily firms play an important role in most nations worldwide because they dominate the economic 
landscape, not only in terms of number, gross revenues, and jobs, but also because they are an im-
portant engine of growth, prosperity, and welfare as well (Heck and Trent, 1999; Astrachan and 
Shanker, 2003; Sirmon et al., 2008). Although various management issues in family firms have been analyzed, there 
are still aspects left for research, such as the relationship between family control and corporate governance structures 
and the influence of generations on these governance mechanisms. The organization of a family firm’s management 
and supervisory boards, and the extent to which they are composed of external managers, can be regarded as exam-
ples of such governance mechanisms. The role of supervisory and advisory boards in family firms is a notable 
example of subject-matter that has been rarely studied (Koeberle-Schmid et al., 2009). 
 
The influence of the incumbent generation of managers has received little attention in previous research. 
Indeed, the transition of family firms from one generation to the next and, in particular, the transition from the 
founder to the subsequent generation (Astrachan, 2003), has been identified as a salient field of research (Chrisman 
et al., 2003; Debicki et al., 2009). A question that is generally regarded as relevant, and yet less focused on, is to 
what extent governance structures and family influence affect the management or supervisory boards and how this 
influence differs with respect to the generation. Moreover, it is unclear whether there exist significant differences 
between first-generation family firms and subsequent generation family firms and whether these differences can be 
found only between the first and second generation or whether subsequent generations also differ among them-
selves.  
 
Previous studies into generational issues of family firms have mainly been conceptual or otherwise qualita-
tive (Beckhard and Dyer, 1983; Schein, 1983). They have also focused on the USA or the UK or have been re-
stricted to selected areas (Davis and Harveston, 1999; Van den Berghe and Carchon, 2002; Suáre and Santana-
Martín, 2004; Voordeckers et al., 2007; Bammens et al., 2008; Duller et al., 2011), or have rarely been concerned 
with differences between generations (Lussier and Sonfield, 2010). This work attempts to close this research gap by 
surveying this topic among Austrian and German family firms. This study provides a better understanding of genera-
tional similarities and differences, as well as the influence of generational issues on governance structures. 
 
 
 
 
F 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Definition Of Family Firm 
 
Concerning the definition and classification of family firms, there is no general consensus in the literature 
(Chrisman et al., 2005; Ibrahim et al., 2008). An often used categorization is the Family Influence on Power, Ex-
perience, and Culture (F-PEC) scale developed by Astrachan et al. (2002). It consists of three subscales - power (the 
family’s involvement in the firm), experience (the level of experience the family has in the business), and culture 
(the extent to which the firm’s culture is a unique culture). The power-subscale is also known as the concept of 
Substantial Family Influence (SFI-concept) and is used to define family firms scientifically and practically in this 
study (Klein, 2000). 
 
Characteristics Of Family Firms From The Point Of View Of Various Theories 
 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) describes settings in which one party – the 
principle – delegates actions to another party – the agent. It is assumed that the principle does not have complete 
information about the agent’s actions and therefore costs arise for obtaining such information (Jacobides and Cro-
son, 2001). All corporate governance instruments, in essence, serve to decrease agency costs by reducing this 
asymmetrical information or by harmonizing the interests of the principal and agent through an appropriate incentive 
structure (Witt, 2008). In family firms, ownership and management usually overlap to a certain extent; therefore, it 
is assumed that agency costs are lower in family-owned firms (Andersen et al., 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009).  
 
Stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997) assumes that managers and employees focus on cooperative or or-
ganizational goals and their possible contribution to these goals. Such altruistic and cooperative behaviour is sup-
posed to be found in family firms (Dyer, 2003; Schulze et al., 2003; Karra et al., 2006; Ulaner et al., 2007; Le 
Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009; Vallejo, 2009). The implementation of formal corporate government mechanisms 
could have negative effects on mutual trust and intrinsic motivation (Davis et al., 1997). 
 
Impact Of Generation On Governance And Management Accounting:  Hypotheses 
 
With the transfer of ownership to the next generation, the number of family members, who act passively 
and are mainly interested in their own economic welfare, increases (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Lane et al., 2006; Miller 
and Le-Breton-Miller, 2006). Furthermore, family ties weaken, which leads to a lower attachment to the firm (Sal-
vato and Melin, 2008) and amongst family members (Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007; Pieper et al., 2008). The number 
of generations involved in the firm increases the risk of conflicts among family members (Witt, 2008) and between 
family and non-family shareholders (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Consistent with agency theory, in can be assumed 
that agency costs increase with transfer of the firm to subsequent generations (Lutz et al., 2010). The decreasing 
attachment of family members to the firm also means that the advantages of having a manager from the owner’s 
family are reduced and the option of taking an external manager becomes more attractive.  
 
The more passive role family members play in later generations, the fewer family members that will be 
available for managerial positions (Lussier and Sonfield, 2010), resulting in vacant positions in the management 
board that can be occupied by external managers.  
 
In addition, various studies have shown that subsequent generations employ “more professional” manage-
ment methods and that this professionalization goes hand in hand with a stronger involvement of non-family manag-
ers (Schein, 1983; Dyer, 1988). The preceding arguments result in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  As firm ownership is passed on to successive generations, the percentage of non-family executives within 
the management board increases. 
 
Depending on country-specific characteristics and the legal form of the firm, as well as its specific factors, 
there is a wide range of terms for the board as well as various modes of organization and composition of this board 
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(Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Koeberle-Schmid et al., 2009; Brenes et al., 2011). In this paper, the term ‘supervisory 
board’ will be used. Note that this is different than an advisory board, which has neither legal standing nor a formal 
role.  
 
According to agency theory, a controlling committee, such as the supervisory board, is required as soon as 
the interests of the owner and those of the manager differ (Pieper et al., 2008; Achleitner et al., 2010). Should 
Hypothesis 1 be valid and the conflict of interests increase with subsequent generations, then the importance of 
supervisory boards increases with each transfer of the firm to another generation (Bammens et al., 2008; Witt, 2008; 
Achleitner et al., 2010). The increasing level of conflict in successive generations could be handled with the super-
visory board’s role as an arbitrator (Bammens et al., 2008). However, the rise of the management board’s wealth of 
experience and organizational knowledge (Astrachan et al., 2002; Miller and Le-Breton-Miller, 2006) with each 
successive generation could lead to the opposite effect (i.e., a lower need for advice) (Bammens et al., 2008). Hence, 
a generation's need for the advice that boards can provide depends on whether the increasing demand for arbitration 
is offset by the decreasing need for experience and knowledge or whether it exceeds it. 
 
According to stewardship theory, boards may not motivate stewards and are therefore inefficient (Lee and 
O'Neill, 2003; Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2007; Pieper et al., 2008). This argument becomes less valid with successive 
generations as family ties and the attachment to the firm weaken. Similarly, the increase in professionalization that 
accompanies successive generations should also result in the formation of a supervisory board (Brenes et al., 2011). 
Therefore, the likelihood of having a supervisory board should increase across generations:  
 
H2:  As firm ownership is passed on to successive generations, the firm is more likely to have implemented a 
supervisory board. 
 
Non-family board members provide better oversight of the management because they are not as bound by 
the social relationships of the family (Westhead and Howorth, 2006; Koeberle-Schmid et al., 2009). Therefore, with 
increasing need for control, the number of outside board members will also increase. With decreasing harmony in 
subsequent generations, the necessity of supervisory boards rises according to stewardship theory.  
 
Furthermore, non-family supervisory board members commonly adopt the role of arbitrators and are asso-
ciated with objective and independent support (Westhead and Howorth, 2006; Brenes et al., 2011). The higher level 
of conflicts in successive generations increases the need for such outside arbitration and objectivity. This leads to a 
higher number of non-family members in boards with later generations: 
 
H3:  As firm ownership is passed on to successive generations, the percentage of non-family members on the 
supervisory board increases. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample 
 
In this study 5,406 Austrian and 7,550 German enterprises with more than 50 employees were asked to 
evaluate the research question during the summer of 2009 (Austria) and 2010 (Germany). The CEOs of the firms 
were invited to participate in the online survey by e-mail. After a first wave of responses, a follow-up e-mail to non-
respondents was sent. In total, 1,422 responses were received, which equals a response rate of 11%. Of the re-
sponses, 986 surveys were evaluable. Eighty-nine survey responses had to be eliminated because of missing infor-
mation regarding the number of employees or because the actual number of employees quoted was lower than 50. In 
addition, it was not possible to examine the status as a family or non-family business for 85 firms, so those were also 
excluded from the analysis. The remaining 812 survey responses built the basis of the sample. Non-response bias 
was controlled by comparing early respondents (first one-third) with late respondents (last one-third) (Leslie, 1972). 
No significant differences in the response behaviours between these two groups were found; therefore, the sample is 
representative (Fowler, 2009). For this research, the sample covers family businesses only (445 family firms). 
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Methodology 
 
To test our hypotheses concerning correlation, we applied either the Pearsons’s chi-squared test or Fisher’s 
exact test at a significance level of α = 0.05. To compare percentages in different groups, first a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test was applied to ensure normal distribution. As all tests for normal distribution were significant (and 
therefore normal distribution was not confirmed), differences in the mean were analysed with a two-sided Mann-
Whitney test (differences of two means), a one-sided Mann-Whitney test (increasing differences of two means), a 
Kruskal-Wallis test (difference of more than two means), or a Jonckheere-Terpstra test (testing an increasing trend 
for more than two means) (Duller, 2008). With the exception of the one-sided Mann-Whitney test, all analyses were 
performed using SPSS v20.0 (IBM, USA). The one-sided Mann-Whitney test is not available in SPSS software; 
therefore, R-Software (R Core Team, 2012) with the package “exactRankTests” (Hothorn and Hornik, 2012) was 
used for this analysis.    
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Four different definitions were used to measure generation using two different variables in the question-
naire.   
 
 The original variable generation has five different values (1
st
 founder, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
, and after), hereinafter 
referred to as “generation (5)”. For the second definition, generation (5) was dichotomized into the variable “genera-
tion (2)” with the two values “founder” and “subsequent” generation. The original variable age was dichotomized 
into “generation (age25)” following the definition in Blanco-Mazagatos et al. (2010) and Gersick et al. (1997) with 
a cut-off point at the age of 25 years. The fourth definition “generation (median age)” follows the same idea but has 
its cut-off point at the median of firm age, which was calculated as 57 years.  
 
Non-Family Executives In Management Board 
 
Table 1 shows the percentage of non-family managers in the management board according to the different 
definitions of generation. In general, the descriptive development of the percentage of non-family executives is 
increasing.  
 
Table 1:  Percentage Of Non-Family Executives According To Generation 
Generation Counts Non-Family Executives (%) Referred To As 
1st (founder) 82 24.9% Generation(5) 
2nd 144 32.2% 
 
3rd 102 33.8% 
 
4th 47 32.2% 
 
5th and subsequent 39 45.3% 
 
1st (founder) 82 24.9% Generation(2) 
2nd and subsequent 332 34.2% 
 
age ≤ 25 67 27.4% Generation(age25) 
age > 25 334 35.1% 
 
age ≤ median 201 31.4% Generation(median age) 
age > median 200 36.2% 
 
 
Table 2 shows the various tests according to Hypothesis 1. In the first step, it is tested, and if there is a dif-
ference in the percentage of non-family executives according to generation, then the hypothesis of an increasing 
percentage among generations is tested in a second step.   
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Table 2:  Percentage Of Non-Family Executives, Tests, And Results 
Definition Testing Test p-value 
generation(5) differences Kruskal-Wallis 0.110 
 
  increasing Jonckheere-Terpstra 0.018 ** 
generation(2) differences Mann-Whitney (two-sided) 0.022 ** 
  increasing Mann-Whitney (one-sided) 0.010 ** 
generation(age25) differences Mann-Whitney (two-sided) 0.139 
 
  increasing Mann-Whitney (one-sided) 0.069 * 
generation(median age) differences Mann-Whitney (two-sided) 0.180 
 
  increasing Mann-Whitney (one-sided) 0.090 * 
 
 According to the Jonckheere-Terpstra test, there is an increasing trend concerning the percentages in 
subsequent generations. The one-sided Mann Whitney test also shows a significant increase in the percentage of 
non-family executives between founder and subsequent generations. Measuring generation by means of age is less 
successful as we have higher p-values for these cases. Thus, generation Hypothesis 1 is supported, but it is not 
supported with regard to age (ɑ = 0.05). Consistent with agency theory and empirical surveys (discussed above in 
the Impact Of Generation On Governance And Management Accounting: Hypotheses section), the results show an 
increasing proportion of non-family executives in management boards.  
 
Existence Of A Supervisory Board 
 
Table 3 presents the percentage of firms within each generation that have implemented a supervisory board. 
While the first generation has implemented a supervisory board in only 6.0% of the cases, the percentage increases 
to 19.5% in the fifth or subsequent generation. Here, the percentages concerning the existence of a supervisory 
board between the second and fifth generations indicate a zigzag development.  
 
Table 3:  Supervisory Board Among Generations 
Generation Counts Supervisory board (%) 
1st (founder) 83 6.0% 
2nd 145 15.9% 
3rd 102 11.6% 
4th 47 8.5% 
5th and subsequent 41 19.5% 
1st (founder) 83 6.0% 
2nd and subsequent 335 14.0% 
age ≤ 25 67 16.4% 
age > 25 338 12.7% 
age ≤ median 204 14.7% 
age > median 201 11.9% 
 
A Pearson’s chi-squared test confirmed no dependence or correlation between generation and the existence 
of a supervisory board. The Kruskal-Wallis test and the Jonckheere-Terpstra test are not statistically significant, 
indicating neither a difference nor an increasing trend in the likelihood of having a supervisory board in subsequent 
generations (see Table 4).  
 
Comparing the founder generation with all subsequent generations, there were statistically significant re-
sults for dependence, difference, and increase (Table 4). Therefore, subsequent generations are more likely to have a 
supervisory board than founder generation. Once again, firm age is not as meaningful as generation. Moreover, the 
likelihood of the existence of a board decreases in older firms (descriptive, not significant). Again, this result is in 
agreement with agency theory because a higher divergence of goals among family members may lead to the need of 
a supervisory board to reduce within family conflicts (refer to Impact Of Generation On Governance And Manage-
ment Accounting: Hypotheses section). 
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Table 4:  Supervisory Board Among Generations 
Definition Testing Test p-value 
generation(5) correlation Chi-Squared 0.121 
 
  difference Kruskal-Wallis 0.122 
 
  increasing Jonckheere-Terpstra 0.276 
 
generation(2) correlation Exact Fisher (one-sided) 0.030 ** 
  difference Mann-Whitney (two-sided) 0.048 ** 
  increasing Mann-Whitney (one-sided) 0.030 ** 
generation(age25) correlation Exact Fisher (one-sided) 0.262 
 
  difference Mann-Whitney (two-sided) 0.417 
 
  increasing Mann-Whitney (one-sided) 0.844 
 
generation(median age) correlation Exact Fisher (one-sided) 0.251 
 
  difference Mann-Whitney (two-sided) 0.414 
 
  increasing Mann-Whitney (one-sided) 0.833 
 
 
Percentage Of Non-Family Members In Supervisory Boards 
 
For the next section of results, some limitations should first be discussed at this point in order to avoid 
wrong conclusions from the results. Unfortunately, the non-response rate for the question concerning the composi-
tion of the supervisory board was very high. As the majority of the non-respondents answered the following ques-
tions, it can be assumed that the respondents did not know the exact composition of the board, especially whether a 
member of the board is a family member. Thus, due to the low response rate and the low number of cases, the next 
set of results presented has to be discussed very carefully.  
 
The results again show a descriptive portion and information on several tests. Table 5 presents the results 
concerning the percentage of non-family members on the supervisory board. In all cases, the majority of the board 
are non-family members. Again, the trends concerning generation and age are inversely related. While generation 
shows a decreasing trend in non-family members on a supervisory board, age shows an increasing trend.  
 
Table 5:  Percentage Of Non-Family Members On The Board 
Generation Counts Non-Family Member In Board (%) 
1st (founder) 5 86.7% 
2nd 22 70.4% 
3rd 12 74.4% 
4th 4 69.1% 
5th and subsequent 8 70.8% 
1st (founder) 8 86.7% 
2nd and subsequent 46 71.4% 
age ≤ 25 10 65.7% 
age > 25 43 73.6% 
age ≤ median 29 68.5% 
age > median 24 76.5% 
 
All tests were not significant (see Table 6); therefore, Hypothesis 3 is rejected. There is no significant dif-
ference in the composition of supervisory boards concerning family and non-family members among subsequent 
generations. Moreover, the percentage of non-family members is decreasing with regard to generation (descriptive).  
 
Table 6:  Percentage Of Non-Family Members On The Board 
Definition Testing Test p-value 
generation(5) correlation Kruskal-Wallis 0.858   
  increasing Jonckheere-Terpstra 0.539   
generation(2) correlation Mann-Whitney (two-sided) 0.271   
  increasing Mann-Whitney (one-sided) 0.864   
generation(age25) correlation Mann-Whitney (two-sided) 0.329   
  increasing Mann-Whitney (one-sided) 0.169   
generation(median age) correlation Mann-Whitney (two-sided) 0.459   
  increasing Mann-Whitney (one-sided) 0.233   
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CONCLUSION 
 
This study attempted to research the impact of a family firm’s incumbent generation on its governance 
mechanisms.  The percentages of non-family executives increase significantly with subsequent generations and 
increase, but not significantly with firm age. In general, subsequent generations have more non-family executives on 
the management board than the founder generation.  
 
With successive generations, the likelihood of an implemented supervisory board increases, but only the 
difference between the founder and subsequent generation was significant. Implementation within subsequent 
generations is not linear, but rather a curve with peaks and valleys. The trend concerning non-family members on 
the board is in the opposite direction of having a board at all; therefore, subsequent generations are more likely to 
have a supervisory board, but the percentage of non-family members on the board decreases. 
 
In contrast to most other studies, which only differentiate between three categories – namely, ‘first’, ‘sec-
ond’, and ‘third and subsequent generations’ - this study also analysed the third and fourth generations separately. 
Secondly, further insights into the widely neglected research area of management accounting in family firms are 
provided. While most of the research on generational issues has been limited to the USA and the UK, this survey 
used Austrian and German data, therefore contributing to the growing body of European analyses (e.g., Suáre and 
Santana-Martín, 2004; Voordeckers et al., 2007; Bammens et al., 2008) that focus on governance aspects. Finally, 
the results show the limitation of defining generation by firm age. This study had the fortunate situation of having 
both variables in one sample, but of the three results, only one was similar concerning generation and age; the 
remaining two results showed opposite trends. 
 
This study has some limitations that should be acknowledged and addressed in future research. First of all, 
the classification of generations could be more precise to make it possible to control for hybrid forms (multi-
generational firms with members from more than one generation). Moreover, future analyses should research the 
differences between family members of a particular generation, such as personal characteristics, attitudes, goals, and 
values, in more detail. 
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